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Abstract
We analyze and discuss encryption schemes for JPEG2000 based on the wavelet packet transform with a key-
dependent subband structure. These schemes have been assumed to reduce the runtime complexity of encryption
and compression. In addition to this “lightweight” nature, other advantages like encrypted domain signal
processing have been reported. We systematically analyze encryption approaches based on key-dependent
subband structures in terms of their impact on compression performance, their computational complexity and the
level of security they provide as compared to more classical techniques. Furthermore, we analyze the prerequisites
and settings in which the previously reported advantages actually hold and in which settings no advantages can
be observed. As a final outcome it has to be stated that the compression integrated encryption approach based
on the idea of secret wavelet packets can not be recommended.
1. Introduction
For securing multimedia data–like any other type of
data–full encryption with a state-of-the-art cipher, is the
most secure option. However, in the area of multimedia
many applications do not require the level of security
this option provides, and seek a trade-off in security to
enable other requirements, including low processing
demands, retaining bitstream compliance and scalability,
and the support for increased functionality, such as,
transparent encryption [1] and region of interest (ROI)
encryption, or signal processing in the encrypted
domain (adaptation, searching, watermarking, ...).
JPEG2000 is the most recent and comprehensive suite
of standards for scalable coding of visual data [2,3].
JPEG2000 filled areas of application that JPEG could not
provide for, especially where applications require a scal-
able representation of the visual data. Recently JPEG2000
has evolved into the format of choice for many specia-
lized and high end applications. For example, the Digital
Cinema Initiative (DCI), an entity created by seven major
motion picture studios, has adopted JPEG2000 as the
compression standard in their specification for a unified
Digital Cinema System [4]. As a second example, in 2002,
the Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
(DICOM) committee approved the final text of DICOM
Supplement 61, marking the inclusion of Part 1 of
JPEG2000 in DICOM (ISO 12052). Furthermore, in the
ISO/IEC 19794 standard on Biometric Data Interchange
Formats JPEG2000 is included for lossy compression, in
the most recently published version (ISO/IEC FDIS
19794-6 as of August 2010) as the only format for iris
image data.
Security techniques specifically tailored to the needs of
scalable representation in general and JPEG2000 in parti-
cular have been proposed recently, e.g., [5-10]. An over-
view and discussion of the proposed approaches in the
context of JPEG2000 can be found in [11]. JPEG2000
security is discussed in JPEG2000 Part 8 [12,13]. This part
has the title “Secure JPEG 2000” and is referred to as
JPSEC. It “intends to provide tools and solutions in terms
of specifications that allow applications to generate, con-
sume, and exchange Secure JPEG 2000 codestreams”
(p. vi). JPSEC extends the codestream syntax to allow
parts which are created by security tools, e.g., cipher or
authentication tools. Encryption is implemented with con-
ventional ciphers, e.g., AES.
The approaches discussed in this article perform
encryption by constructing a secret transform domain.
The principal idea of such schemes is that without the
key the transform coefficients cannot be interpreted or
decoded and therefore no access to the source material is
possible (or only at a very low quality). Other than with
bitstream-oriented methods, which operate on a final
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coded media bitstream, these methods apply encryption
integrated with compression. In terms of applicability
they are therefore restricted to scenarios where the final
media bitstream is not yet available (video conferencing,
live streaming, photo storage, transmission, and storage
of surveillance data etc.).
Transparent encryption was introduced in the context of
TV broadcasting [1,14] and denotes encryption schemes
for which public access is granted for a preview image, i.e.,
anyone can decode an image of reduced quality from the
encrypted stream, even without the key data. The differ-
ence to other media encryption schemes that guarantee a
certain degree of distortion is that the preview image has
to be of a (specified) minimum quality, i.e., apart from the
security requirement, there is also a quality requirement
[10,15]. Broadcasting applications, for example, can benefit
from transparent encryption, as they, rather than prevent-
ing unauthorized viewers from receiving and watching
their content completely, aim at promoting a contract
with non-paying watchers, for whom the availability of a
preview version (in lower quality) may serve as an incen-
tive to pay for the full quality version. The reason for con-
sidering transparent encryption as target application
scenario is that it has been shown [16], that the lowest
resolution contained in a JPEG2000 file encrypted using
the techniques discussed in this article can always be
decoded by an attacker. This makes the approaches suita-
ble for transparent encryption only, but prevents usage in
applications requiring a higher degree of confidentiality.
In [17] the authors suggest to use secret Fourier-based
transforms for the encryption of visual data. Other propo-
sals in the area of lightweight encryption [18] propose the
encryption of the filter choice used for a wavelet decom-
position. However, this suggestion remains vague and is
not supported by any experiments, while [19,20] propose
encrypting the orthogonal filterbanks used for an non-
stationary multi-resolution analysis (NSMRA) decomposi-
tion. The use of concealed biorthogonal parametrized
wavelet filters for lightweight encryption is proposed by
[21]. The use of key-dependent wavelet packet decomposi-
tions is proposed first by [22,23]. The latter study [23]
evaluates encryption based on key-dependent subband
structures in a zerotree-based wavelet codec. Parametrized
wavelet filters have been employed for JPEG2000 light-
weight encryption by [24,25], however, this approach was
shown to be insecure in later study [26]. The scrambling
of discrete cosine transform (DCT) and discrete wavelet
transform (DWT) coefficients is proposed in [27]. Recently
secret DCT-based transforms have been proposed for
image and video encryption [28].
In the context of JPEG2000, the degrees of freedom in
the wavelet transform are a prime candidate for con-
structing a secret transform domain. JPEG2000, Part 2,
allows the definition of custom wavelet filters and user-
defined isotropic and anisotropic wavelet packet subband
structures [29]. Exemplary wavelet packets are shown in
Figure 1.
Key-dependent wavelet packets in JPEG2000 have been
proposed for a lightweight encryption scheme in earlier
studies [16,30,31]. This approach is in the focus of interest
in this study. The suggested scheme can be seen as a form
of header encryption, as only the information pertaining
to the transform domain needs to be encrypted, the rest of
the data remains in plaintext. This approach has the
advantage that only the parameters of the secret transform
domain need to be kept secret. Therefore the demands for
the encryption stage are minimal as compared to a more
traditional, bitstream-oriented encryption approach [16].
Due to the shift in complexity from actual encryption to
the compression pipeline, the scheme has been termed
“lightweight”. An overview of the two different systems
KDWP encryption and conventional encryption is shown
in Figure 2.
In this article, we evaluate, analyze, and discuss earlier
proposed JPEG2000 encryption techniques that use key-
dependent wavelet packets (KDWP) to establish a secret
transform domain. Wavelet packets (WP) are introduced
in Section 2.. We assess KDWP encryption with respect to
the following three main properties of an image encryp-
tion scheme:
- Compression impact: KDWP encryption reduces
compression performance, the actual decrease is evalu-
ated in Section 3..
- Computational demand: The main argument for
introducing the general concept of secret transform
domains in encryption has always been an improved
runtime performance, as the conventional encryption
step is not needed. This assumption is in-depth evalu-
ated and analyzed in Section 4..
- Security: The security of KDWP is in-depth ana-
lyzed in Section 5.. Special care has been taken to
employ the suitable notion of security for multime-
dia encryption.
In Section 6. we combine the individual assessments of
the previous sections and in-depth discuss other potential
advantages of KDWP. Another potential advantage of
KDWP encryption is the capability of performing signal
processing operations on the protected data (“encrypted
domain processing”), which are compared to the opera-
tions possible on a conventionally encrypted JPEG2000
bitstream. Final conclusion are drawn in Section 7..
2. Wavelet packets
The wavelet packet (WP) transform [32] generalizes the
pyramidal wavelet transform. In the WP transform,
apart from the approximation subband also the detail
Engel et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2012, 2012:2
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/2




(b) Isotropic WP (c) Anisotropic WP (d) Exemplary test
image
Figure 1 Exemplary wavelet packet decompositions and test image.
Figure 2 Conventional encryption versus KDWP.
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subband can be decomposed; an example is shown in
Figure 1. The WP can be adapted to take the properties
of the image to be transformed into account, for exam-
ple by using the best basis algorithm [32-36]. In this
article we refer to each such a WP basis by the terms
“WP subband structure”, “decomposition structure” or
briefly “WP”.
The anisotropic WP transform is a generalization of the
isotropic case: whereas in the latter, horizontal and vertical
wavelet decomposition are always applied in pairs for each
subband to be decomposed, this restriction is lifted for the
anisotropic WP transform (for an example see Figure 1c).
Note that for the isotropic WP transform a single
decomposition refers to both horizontal and vertical filter-
ing and downsampling. For the anisotropic WP transform,
a decompositions refers to filtering and downsampling in
one direction (horizontal or vertical). Therefore, a decom-
position depth of 2 g in the anisotropic case is comparable
to a decomposition depth of g in the isotropic case.
2.1 WP in JPEG2000
Part 2 of the JPEG2000 standard [29] allows more decom-
position structures than Part 1. Every subband resulting
from a highpass filtering can be decomposed at most two
more times (either horizontally, vertically or in both
directions).
In order to maximize keyspace size for the proposed
encryption scheme, we have implemented full support for
arbitrary isotropic and anisotropic wavelet decomposition
structures in JPEG2000, based on the JJ2000 reference
implementation.a The source code for the implementation
underlying all results in this paper can be downloaded
from http://www.wavelab.at/sources.
2.2 Randomized generation of isotropic WPs
A WP can be derived by a sequence of random binary
decomposition decisions. The seed s for the employed
secure random number generator is the main parameter
for the randomized generation of WP, i.e., comparable to
the key in a symmetric crpyto system.
2.2.1 Uniform distribution
A uniformly distributed selection is achieved with the fol-
lowing randomized algorithm. For each subband (starting
at the root subband, i.e., the entire image) it is randomly
decided whether the subband is further decomposed. The
probability of a decomposition of a subband depends on
the number of sub-transforms within the subband, which
is equivalent to Qg-l where g is the maximum decomposi-
tion depth and l is the level of the subband.
pu(l) = 1 − 1
Qg−l
, Qj = Q4j−1 + 1, Q0 = 1
Subsequently, this distribution is referred to isouni.
2.2.2 Compression-oriented distribution
The compression-friendly randomized algorithm for WP
selection enforces the decomposition of the approxima-
tion subbands, for all other subbands a possible decom-
position is determined by a layer-dependent probability,
pc(l), which depends on two input parameters, the base
value b and the change factor c, which serves as multi-
plier for the level l:
pc(l) = 1 − b + cl2
Only the parameters, b, c and the seed of the random
number generator need to be encrypted. Subsequently,
these distributions are denoted/abbreviated by iso and
further classified into a constrained (the LL is always
further decomposed) and an unconstrained case.
2.3 Randomized generation of anisotropic WPs
The main motivation to introduce anisotropic WPs in
the context of lightweight encryption is a significant
increase in keyspace size [30,31]. This increase is due to
the fact that the anisotropic transform has substantially
more WP for a comparable maximum decomposition
depth. The number anisotropic WP is given by the fol-
lowing recursion:
Rj = 1 + 2R2j−1 − R4j−2, R−2 = R−1 = 0
Even more than in the case of isotropic WPs, there
are anisotropic WP decompositions that are ill-suited
for energy compaction. The compression-oriented selec-
tion method tries to eliminate these subband structures.
2.3.1 Uniform distribution
We use the case distinction introduced by [37] to con-
struct a uniform distribution for the selection of a ran-
dom subband structure: the probability for any case to be
chosen is the ratio of the number of subband structures
contained in the case to the total number of subband
structures. Subsequently, this distribution is often
denoted/abbreviated by anisouni.
2.3.2 Compression-oriented distribution
The basic algorithm for the compression-oriented genera-
tion of randomized anisotropic WPs is similar to the iso-
tropic case, only the direction of the decomposition
(vertical or horizontal) is additionally chosen at random.
However, constraining the degree of anisotropy is neces-
sary in order to prevent subbands from being decomposed
excessively in a single direction, as, especially in the case
of the approximation subband, this would lead to inferior
energy compaction in the transform domain and thus to
inferior compression results. The parameter q is used to
restrict the maximum degree of anisotropy for the approx-
imation subband. For the degree of anisotropy ϒ of a sub-
band we use the following definition:
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ϒ(h, v) = v − h (1)
where h and v are the decomposition depths in hori-
zontal and vertical direction, respectively. If at any node
during the randomized generation of an anisotropic WP
subband structure, decomposition of the subband at this
node in the randomly chosen direction would result in
the degree of anisotropy exceeding the maximum degree
of anisotropy, the direction of the decomposition is
changed. The degree of anisotropy for the approxima-
tion and detail subbands influence both, compression
performance and keyspace size.
The other parameters are used in the same way as in
the isotropic case: The base value b sets the basic prob-
ability of decomposition, the change factor c alters this
base probability depending on the current decomposi-
tion level l.
3. Evaluation of compression performance
In previous study [16,30] parameter settings for the
compression-oriented distribution have been determined
for a small number of test images. For the isotropic
wavelet packet transform it is proposed to force a maxi-
mum decomposition depth for the approximation sub-
band. For the anisotropic wavelet packet transform, in
addition to forcing a maximum decomposition depth,
the maximum degree of anisotropy for the approxima-
tion subband needs to be restricted to preserve com-
pression performance.
The parameters proposed by [16,30] were obtained
empirically by a number of experiments. A large num-
ber of different parameter settings were used, but only
on three test images. The parameters that were obtained
for these three test images are a base value b of 0.25
and a change factor c of 0.1. For the isotropic case the
global decomposition depth g has been set to 5. For the
anisotropic case g has been set to 10 and the maximal
degree of anisotropy of the approximation subband q
has been set to 1. Recall that we follow the convention
to give the decomposition depth of the isotropic wavelet
packet transform in pairs of (horizontal and vertical)
decompositions, whereas in the anisotropic case each
(horizontal or vertical) decomposition step is counted
separately.
We use these parameters in our experiments and eval-
uate their performance for a larger set of test images.
We verify the compression performance of the compres-
sion-oriented selection method by an empirical study
based on an extended set of images. For this purpose
we use a set of 100 gray-scale images of 512 × 512 pix-
els (taken with four different camera models).
We use five different bitrates: 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1, and 2
bpp. For each of the test images we performed the
following JPEG2000 compression tests at each of these
bitrates:
- Pyramidal (1 subband structure, level 5),
- Isouni: random isotropic wavelet packets drawn
according to the uniform distribution with g = 5
(100 randomly selected subband structures),
- Iso (constrained): random isotropic wavelet packets
drawn according to the compression-oriented distri-
bution with g = 5, b = 0.25, and c = 0.1 (100 ran-
domly selected subband structures),
- Anisouni: random anisotropic wavelet packets
drawn according to the uniform distribution with
g = 10 (100 randomly selected subband structures),
and
- Aniso (constrained): random isotropic wavelet
packets drawn according to the compression-
oriented distribution with g = 10, b = 0.25, c = 0.1,
and q = 1 (100 randomly selected subband
structures).
To ensure comparability the same seeds (and therefore
the same decomposition structures) were chosen for each
image at each of the five different rates. The standard
CDF 9/7 biorthogonal wavelet was used for transforma-
tion in all experiments. The results of our empirical
study are summarized for the five categories and all
bitrates in Figure 3.
For the compression-oriented setup, the loss in com-
pression performance is smaller for the anisotropic rando-
mized decomposition method (below 1dB). Due to the fact
that randomized anisotropic wavelet packets require fewer
decompositions for the same keyspace size, the compres-
sion performance achieved in the anisotropic setup is
superior to the isotropic setup. For the set of natural test
images the pyramidal decomposition remains the setup
with the best compression performance. In part this is due
to the overhead in header data that is introduced in the
JPEG2000 bitstream by increasing the number of sub-
bands (as is usually the case in KDWP). Table 1 shows the
average ratio of header data to packet data for all test
images at different bitrates. As the header size is less
affected by bitrate it can be seen that the ratio increases
when the bitrate decreases and can make up a substantial
part of the bitstream.
As regards the difference between uniform and com-
pression-oriented selection, it can be seen that the com-
pression performance of the latter is above the
compression performance of the former. The difference
is more evident for the anisotropic case, for which a pre-
dominant decomposition of the approximation subband
in a single direction, which leads to inferior energy com-
paction for natural images, is possible. Restricting the
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maximum degree of anisotropy for the approximation
subband in the compression-oriented selection leads to a
compression performance that is closer to the pyramidal
decomposition.
From an compression performance point of view, the
compression-oriented distributions are favorable,
although, even these distributions considerably decrease
compression efficiency.
4. Computational complexity
In order to compare the computational complexity of
KDWP encryption compared to conventional compres-
sion and encryption it is sufficient to determine the dif-
ference. The main difference between KDWP encryption
and conventional compression and encryption is the
transform stage, a random WP is chosen for KDWP
encryption, while in a conventional encryption approach
the pyramidal decomposition is employed. In the com-
monly applied PCRDO coding approach (post-compres-
sion-rate-distortion optimization) the complexity of the
remaining compression (labeled “RCompression” in
Figure 2) is almost completely independent of the bitrate
and thus the difference in complexity is almost comple-
tely due to the difference in the transform stage. In the
conventional approach there is an additional encryption
process after compression, which is linearly bit-rate-
dependent. First we present experimental performance
results in Section 4..1 and complement the findings with
a theoretical performance analysis in Section 4..2.
4.1 Experimental performance evaluation
The experimental results have been obtained using our
JJ2000-based implementation. The test set consisted of
100 grey-scale images with a resolution of 512 × 512. Both
the implementation and the test set will be publicly avail-
able at http://www.wavelab.at/sources/. The tests were
conducted on an Intel Core 2 CPU 6700 @2.66 GHz.
Table 2 summarizes the results for the pyramidal decom-
position and the different selection schemes, the uniform
distribution ("isouni”) and the compression-oriented distri-
bution ("isouni”). The results are averages of hundred
trials. Additionally we need to determine the complexity
of AES encryption, which is given in Table 3 [11]. These
results enable us to determine the complexity in depen-
dence of a varying bit-rate, which is shown in Figure 4.
The bit-rate in bpp (bit per pixel) is plotted against the
complexity given in average processing time for in image
in seconds. Clearly the additional complexity of AES
encryption is negligible, compared to the complexity intro-


















Figure 3 Empirical results: average compression performance (100 images).
Table 1 Ratio of header data to packet data for different
compression rates (16 quality layers)
Rate pyramidal iso aniso
0.125 15.9% 32.8% 20.8%
0.25 10.0% 20.8% 15.1%
0.5 6.1% 13.6% 9.6%
1 3.7% 9.2% 5.9%
2 2.5% 6.4% 3.9%
Table 2 Average compression complexity with our
implementation
structure avg. t avg. fps
pyramidal 0.643 s 1.55 fps
iso 1.005 s 1 fps
isouni 1.147 s 0.87 fps
aniso 0.726 s 1.34 fps
anisouni 1.891 s 0.53 fps
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uniform distribution performs worst by far, which is to
some extend implementation-specific. Very anisotropic
subbands are obviously not very efficiently dealt with our
implementation.
However, one might argue that our Java based imple-
mentation does not reflect the state-of-the-art. One of
the fastest implementations, the Kakadu implementa-
tionb, even achieves 39.88 fps compared to 1.55 fps with
our implementation (compression with the pyramidal
decomposition, 2 bpp, 5 level wavelet decomposition and
no quality layers), and thus is about 25 times faster.
Therefore we also show results for an hypothetical opti-
mized implementation that even outperforms Kakadu by
a factor of 2, i.e., is 50 times faster than our implementa-
tion (see Figure 5). Nonetheless the basic assessment
stays the same, no performance benefits with KDWP can
be gained even with an optimized implementation.
The final question is whether it is at all possible to gain
any performance benefits with KDWP (even with the
most optimized implementation) compared to AES
encryption. This question can only be answered with a
theoretical analysis.
4.2 Theoretical performance analysis
We determine the computational complexities on a ran-
dom access machine with an instruction set of basic
operations, such as ^, &, +, *, and %.
As we are only interested in the difference of the com-
plexities it is sufficient to determine the complexity of
the pyramidal wavelet transform, the average WP trans-
form, and AES encryption.
The wavelet transform stage consists of iterated filter
operations, the number of filter operations depends on
the WP and the number of pixels. For every input pixel
and decomposition level two filter operations are
required for the isotropic case. A single filter operation
with an n-length filter consists of n multiplications, n
additions, n MemReads and a single MemWrite, which
yields 25 operations for n = 8 (JPEG2000’s 9/7 irreversi-
ble filter).
In order to determine the average/expected complex-
ity of the KDWP, we determine the expected average
decomposition depth of the WP drawn from one of the
two proposed selection schemes. The complexity analy-
sis based on the average decomposition depth allows us
to analyze the complexity of the WT and the KDWP
independent of the image resolutions, as for every pixel
the computational complexity is given by the average
decomposition depth times the number of necessary
operations for filtering. For the pyramidal wavelet
decomposition with decomposition depth g, the average





The expected average decomposition depth for the
uniform distribution on isotropic WP with a maximum
decomposition depth g, Dg can be derived recursively:
Table 3 Runtime performance of encryption routines
AES encryption
Method throughput codestreams with 2bpp







































Pyramidal Decomposition + AES
Figure 4 Comparison with our implementation.
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, D0 = 0
g − 1 ≤ Dg ≤ g − 1/2, Dk+1 ≈ k + 0.41174
The expected decomposition depth for the compres-
sion-oriented distribution without considering the
forced decomposition of the approximation subbands is
denoted Dcg. For briefness we denote pc(l) = pl and the
probability of the converse event as ql = 1 -pl. D
c
l,g gives
the expected decomposition depth of a subband at level






















If we take the enforced decomposition of approxima-
tion subbands into account (constrained case), we






















g for different maximum isotropic decom-
position depths.
The expected decomposition depth for a uniform dis-
tribution on anisotropic WP is denoted Dag and can be
determined by the following recursion:
∀i ∈ N : A−i = 0, Ag = 1 + 2A2g−1 − A4g−2












Dag ≈ g − 1 + 0.5301
The expected decomposition depth for the compres-
sion-oriented distribution is denoted Dacg . D
ac
l,g gives the
expected decomposition depth of a subband at level l






















Table 5 shows the average decomposition depths of
Dag, and D
ac






































Pyramidal Decomposition + AES
Figure 5 Comparison with an optimized implementation.
Table 4 The expected average decomposition depth for
isotropic WP distributions (b = 1/4, c = 0)





1 0.5 0.857 1
2 1.41176 1.6406 1.90625
3 2.41174 2.3105 2.70703
4 3.41174 2.89673 3.40967
5 4.41174 3.40946 4.02496
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According to [38] and backed-up by our own analysis
352.625 operations are necessary for the encryption of a
single byte with AES with a 128-bit key in CTR-mode.
The overall results are shown in Figure 6, the bitrate in
bpp is plotted against the computational complexity in
unit cost for the different approaches. Also the theoretical
analysis backups the basic claim that no performance
improvements can be gained from isotropic KDWP for
the relevant bitrate ranges. Anisotropic uniform KDWP
performs worst (similar to our experimental results). How-
ever, the difference to the other approaches is much smal-
ler, clearly indicating that the JJ2000 implementation does
not cope well with very anisotropic subbands. Only the
anisotropic compression-oriented KDWP can theoretically
perform slightly better for bit-rates in excess of 1.4 bpp.
Note that even in the most optimized implementations
this will not be achievable as AES has much more faster
local data access, compared to the KDWP. Faster local
data access is not reflected in our computational model.
5. Security evaluation
In order to assess the security of a multimedia encryption
approach, we first need to define “security” of a multime-
dia cryptosystem more precisely. Conventional notions of
security for cryptosystems require that the ciphertext
does not leak any information (information-theoretic
approach [39]) or any efficiently computable information
(the approach of modern cryptography [40]) of the plain-
text. This kind of security notions are also referred to as
MP-security (message privacy) [41]. However this type of
security is rarely met nor targeted by multimedia encryp-
tion schemes. Thus multimedia encryption is often ana-
lyzed with respect to a full message recovery, i.e., how
hard is it for an attacker to reconstruct the (image) data.
This type of security notion is referred to as MR-security
(message recovery) [41]. However, a reconstruction of a
multimedia datum (on the basis of the ciphertext) may
have excellent quality and even be perceived as identical
by a human observer, while the perfect recovery of the
entire message remains impossible.
Thus in the context of multimedia encryption it is
required to take the quality of a reconstruction (by an
adversary on the basis of the ciphertext) into account.
An adversary, who tries to break a multimedia encryp-
tion system, is successful if she can efficiently compute
a “high quality” reconstruction of the original multime-
dia datum. Which quality constitutes a security threat
highly depends on the targeted application scenario [11].
In [42] this multimedia-specific security notion is
termed MQ-security (message quality), similar concepts
can be found in the multimedia encryption literature
[43,44].
5.1 Usual security analysis: key space
Commonly a multimedia encryption security analysis
consists of counting the key space. The common con-
clusion is that if the key space is large enough the pro-
posed approach is believed to be secure. The number of
Table 5 The expected average decomposition depth for
anisotropic WP distributions (b = 1/4, c = 0)



























Pyramidal Decomposition + AES
Figure 6 Theoretical comparison of computational complexity.
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possible WP is huge even for moderate maximum
decomposition depths (e.g., 2261.6 for isotropic g = 5,
and 21321.9 for an anisotropic depth of 10). Thus the
common conclusion would be to consider the scheme
secure. Additionally the quality of a reconstruction with
a wrong key is often analyzed in literature. However, if
we try to decode a JPEG2000 codestream with a wrong
WP the decoder will not be able to decode an image, as
the WP is required for the decoding. Information, such
as the subband/codeblock size and the number of code-
blocks in a subband, which is required to make sense of
the coded data, is missing. Thus a naive attacker would
need to test half of the possible WP before the correct
is identified (on average). A futile approach given the
number of WP!
5.2 Improved security analysis: entropy
We have presented two basic KDWP selection schemes,
namely uniform and compression-oriented. So far the
compression-oriented scheme shows advantages, both in
terms of compression efficiency and runtime perfor-
mance. However, the key space counting approach only
reflects a security analysis if the WP are drawn according
to a uniform distribution. How can we properly assess
the security of the compression-oriented distribution?
The appropriate measure is the entropy H(X) of the com-
pression-oriented distribution. An attacker needs to test
2H(X)-1 keys (WP) on average to find the correct key. The
entropy H(X) for the compression oriented distribution is
a bit tricky to compute (see Appendix 1). Table 6 sum-
marizes the results for previously proposed parameters
and for the isotropic case.
Still the numbers are sufficiently large such that we
have to conclude that KDWP in JPEG2000 are secure.
Since entropy values in excess of state-of-the-art ciphers
key set sizes (128 bit) can be considered secure, security
is sufficient for g > 5 in the compression oriented case
and for g > 4 in the case of uniform WP distribution.
Since the number of anisotropic WP is by far greater
than the number of isotropic WP (for comparable maxi-
mum decomposition depths, remember an isotropic
decomposition depth g corresponds to an anisotropic
decomposition depth of 2 g), the anisotropic case has to
be considered secure as well.
Note that this analysis holds for every scheme that
strongly requires the WP for decoding. However, the
key question now is whether this requirement is strong
for JPEG2000 or whether it can be weakened by exploit-
ing specifically tailored attacks.
In the following we will argue that such specifically-
tailored attacks can be designed for KDWP with
JPEG2000 and that they will be even more effective if
only the permissible WP of JPEG2000 Part 2 are
employed.
5.3 Specific attacks against KDWP in JPEG2000
Due to JPEG2000 coding the LL subband can be recon-
structed by an attacker with a special-purpose decoder.
The LL subband can be decoded, because the coded LL
subband data is located at the start of JPEG2000 file.
Thus an attacker can decode a low-resolution image, a
fact that has already been highlighted in previous study
[16]. The previous conclusion has been that KDWP in
JPEG2000 are only suitable for the application scenario
of transparent encryption.
In this study we pose a new question: can an attacker
go further and decode subsequent resolutions, i.e., images
with an higher quality than targeted? In fact resolution
only loosely corresponds to perceived quality, but as
every subsequent improvement an attacker can achieve
(by image enhancement operations) starts from a pre-
viously deciphered lower resolution it makes sense to use
resolution as sole quality indicator within the scope of
this work. The quality of an attacked image is determined
as the fraction of original resolution divided by the
obtained resolution (given in the number of pixels).
Thus the attacker’s problem is: given access to a low-
resolution image how hard is it to obtain/decode the
next resolution? Figure 7 illustrates the problem for iso-
tropic and anisotropic decompositions.
Therefore, we first need to answer whether the next
resolution can be decoded from the codestream (indepen-
dently of the higher resolutions). This is the case in the
coding framework of JPEG2000. A resolution can be
decoded independently from the remaining higher resolu-
tions (definitely for resolution progression and at least at
the lowest quality for layer progression and always if SOP
and EPH markers are employed which signal packet
borders).
The next question is whether it is decidable that the
employed subband decomposition structure is the cor-
rect one. It is also highly likely that it can be decided
whether the correct decomposition structure has been
employed in the decoding of a resolution: Firstly, the
wavelet resolutions are not independent, i.e., statistical
cross-resolution dependencies are highly likely to iden-
tify the correct decomposition. Secondly, the codestream
syntax and semantics must also be met while decoding
Table 6 Entropy of the isotropic compression-oriented
distribution (b = 1/4, c = 0) and the uniform distribution
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with a subband decomposition structure, i.e., decoding
errors clearly indicate an incorrect decomposition
structure.
Thus the decomposition structure of a resolution can
be determined independently of the higher resolutions
in JPEG2000.
Now, how hard is it for an adversary to decode a cer-
tain resolution? We first discuss the standardized case
of JPEG2000 Part 2.
5.3.1 JPEG2000 Part 2
In JPEG2000 Part 2 a high frequency subband may only be
decomposed two more times (either isotropic or anisotro-
pic). In the case of isotropic WP, every next resolution
may only be secured by Q32 = 17
3 = 4913 possibilities. In
the case of anisotropic WP, a subband has only R2 = 18
possibilities to be further decomposed. Thus the restric-
tions of Part 2 and both distinct cases do not offer security
for each subsequent resolution. An attacker would need
only 4913/2 or 18/2 trials on average to decode each sub-
sequent resolution.
However, JPEG2000 Part 2 allows to specify either hori-
zontal, vertical or horizontal and vertical decomposition
for a subband, i.e., there are four different subband struc-
tures for a single subband (no decomposition, vertical,
horizontal, or both) in one step. The low resolution sub-
band can have three high frequency subbands (HL, LH,
HH) or one high frequency subband (either horizontal or
vertical). These high frequency subbands may be decom-
posed two more times, which yields 44 +42 + 42 -1 = 287
different subband decomposition structures for such a
subband. 44 is the number of possibilities after a decompo-
sition in both directions and 42 is the number of possibili-
ties after either a horizontal or a vertical decomposition,
one WP is counted three times (thus -2) and no decompo-
sition also has to be counted (+1). Figure 7a shows the
case with three subbands. There are three cases:
- Three subbands (HL, LH, HH), which leads to
2873 = 23639903 possible WP.
- One vertical subband, which has 287 possible WP.
- One horizontal subband, which has 287 possible
WP.
In summary there are about 224.49 possible WP for a
subsequent resolution in Part 2. Though less than 224
checks are quite an effort, this number of checks is still
computationally feasible.
Thus the application of a JPEG2000 Part 2 encoder
and KDWP can not be considered secure (neither MR-
secure nor MQ-secure) due to the restrictions in terms
of admissible WP. For non-standard WP security is
expected to be increased.
5.3.2 Non-standard WP
The complexity an adversary has to face is given by the
entropy of the distribution on the WP on a certain reso-
lution. Tables 7 and 8 summarize the results, while
details on the computation are given in Appendix 2). An
attacker has to try 2H(X)-1 WP on average to decode a cer-
tain resolution/quality.
In the isotropic case the compression oriented distri-
bution all obtained entropy values are below state-of-
the-art cipher key-length (AES has at least 128 bit). The
uniform distribution also results in entropy values below
AES minimum key length, except for the highest resolu-
tion. The anisotropic case with uniform distribution
shows higher entropy values, but at a quality of 1/16
security drops far below AES minimum key length. The







Figure 7 Attack against a subsequent resolution.
Table 7 Entropy for the distribution on resolutions of the
isotropic compression-oriented distribution (g = 5, b = 1/4,
c = 0) and the uniform distribution
Res. at level Quality Entropy (iso) Entropy (isouni)
0 1 114.0 261.6
1 1/4 28.7 65.4
2 1/16 7.5 16.3
3 1/64 2.2 4.1
4 1/256 0.8 1.0
5 1/1024 0.0 0.0
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distribution is expected to be far below the security
levels of the uniform distribution. In general an attacker
can compute lower resolutions, while only the higher
resolutions remain well-protected.
6. Discussion
Media encryption schemes relying on secret transform
domains have been proposed mainly motivated by the
significant reduction of the computational demand for
encryption as compared to traditional transparent
encryption methods and by potential capabilities in
encrypted domain signal processing. A thorough analysis
of the properties of the KDWP approach has revealed
that significant disadvantages as compared to conven-
tional compression and encryption schemes exist.
- Compression impact: The KDWP approach obviously
reduces compression performance. If all possible sub-
band structures are equally likely, the approach is not
be suitable for application due to the high variance of
obtained compression results. The approach of prun-
ing the set of all subband structures (compression
oriented distribution) improves the compression per-
formance, however, still with this technique, a signifi-
cant loss exists. On the other hand, conventional
encryption of course does not at all influence compres-
sion performance.
- Computational demand: Although the additional
complexity of encryption with KDWP in a compres-
sion framework, such as JPEG2000, seems to be negli-
gible at a first glance, our careful analysis and our
evaluation results clearly show that runtime advan-
tages can not be achieved compared to state-of-the-art
cryptographic ciphers (AES). In general we advise to
carefully reconsider statements about an improved
runtime performance of transform based image and
video encryption schemes.
- Security: From a security point of view, state-of-
the-art cryptographic ciphers are superior to KDWP.
The KDWP schemes cannot prevent access to lower
resolutions and are thus less secure in terms MQ-
security. Within the standardized framework of
JPEG2000 Part 2, the KDWP approach is completely
insecure, i.e., an attacker is able to reconstruct the
entire image.
From the proposed KDWP schemes, the anisotropic
compression oriented scheme is best performing. How-
ever, even this approach is overall outperformed by con-
ventional compression and encryption, which shows no
decrease in compression performance, better runtime
performance and cryptographic security.
Apart from an improved runtime performance, image
encryption schemes can offer an improved functionality.
On the one hand improved functionality could be suitabil-
ity for specific applications, such as transparent encryp-
tion. However, transparent encryption can also be
implemented in the conventional approach [10], the small
resolution portion of the JPEG2000 file is simply left in
plaintext. A standardized tool, namely JPSEC, can be
employed to signal all the meta-data (keys, plaintext
parts). Even completely JPEG2000-compliant implementa-
tions are possible [10], which do not require special soft-
ware for decoding, a great advantage for real-world
deployment of transparent encryption. Transparent
encryption with KDWP requires a special decoder, i.e., an
attacker’s decoder, that can cope with wrong or missing
WP structure information, while JPSEC-based approaches
require a JPSEC-capable decoder. Thus, the support of
transparent encryption by KDWP is not an advantage
compared to other approaches, which are more flexible.
The conventional approach offers full confidentiality/cryp-
tographic security (MP-security).
Image encryption schemes may also allow special
encrypted domain processing, which may justify their
application although there are disadvantages in compres-
sion, computational demand and security. A good example
is encrypted content that can still be robustly water-
marked; this feature would outweigh many disadvantages.
6..1 Encrypted domain processing
In fact for KDWP in JPEG2000, the encrypted domain is
a scrambled JPEG2000 bitstream and only signal proces-
sing operations that can be conducted in this domain
are possible. In fact the only possible processing is the
truncation of the scrambled bitstream, which results in
an almost rate-distortion optimal rate adaptation (in
case the underlying bitstream is in quality progression
order). However, truncation of an encrypted bitstream is
also possible with conventional block ciphers if the are
used in the proper mode, e.g., counter mode.
Table 8 Entropy for the distribution of decomposition
structures of a resolution as induced by the anisotropic
uniform distribution (g = 10, b = 1/4, c = 0)
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Signal processing operations which rely on transform
coefficient data cannot be applied to KDWP protected
data as these data can not be decoded. Given the results of
our evaluation and analysis (decreased compression per-
formance, increased computational complexity, decreased
security, no other advantages) it has to be stated that
hardly any sensible realistic application scenarios can be
identified for KDWP-based encryption at the present time.
7. Conclusion
A primary argument for proposing KDWP-based encryp-
tion has always been its “lightweight” nature, introduced
by shifting complexity from encryption into the compres-
sion pipeline. When comparing JPEG2000 encryption with
key-dependent wavelet packets (KDWP) to the conven-
tional approach (AES encryption), we have assessed an
overall increase in computational complexity through
additional complexity introduced in the compression step.
Signal processing in the encrypted domain, often used as
a second argument favoring transform-based image
encryption schemes, does not offer advantages compared
to the appropriate application of conventional ciphers.
The security of JPEG2000 encryption with KDWP has
been analyzed in depth and has been found to be less
secure than conventional encryption, as smaller resolution
images remain accessible. Security can not be achieved at
all if only permissible subband structures of JPEG2000
Part 2 are employed.
All these facts taken together with a slight decrease in
compression efficiency as compared to classical (pyrami-
dal) JPEG2000 make KDWP-based encryption approaches
not suitable for most application scenarios.
The presented assessment should serve as guideline in
the future development of image and video encryption
schemes. The following general conclusions may be
drawn: Computational complexity will need to be carefully
(re)considered for transform-based image and video
encryption schemes. Security has to be analyzed with
respect to a multimedia specific security notion (MQ-
security). Image and video encryption schemes have to
provide conclusive evidence for improved functionality,
such as encrypted domain signal processing.
Appendix 1: Details on the entropy computation
of WP distributions
A WP (wavelet packet subband structure) is derived by the
following randomized algorithm (see Section 2..2.2): every
subband at depth l is further decomposed with a certain
probability pl, which may only depend on the depth l.
Game tree
This randomized algorithm can be illustrated with the
corresponding game tree. A game tree Gg is the tuple (V,
E, l, p):
V . . . set of vertices, E ⊂ V × V . . . set of edges, l : E → {0, 1}∗, p : E → R+
The vertices of a game tree correspond to a certain WP.
The edge label (l) in a game tree indicates decomposition
decisions and is associated with the probability p that this
decomposition decisions are selected in the randomized
algorithm. In Figure 8a game tree is illustrated, showing
the edge labels and the vertices. The first decision is
whether the entire image gets decomposed (split into four
subbands), there are two outcomes, an edge labeled with a
“0” indicates no decomposition, an edge labeled with a “1”
indicates a decomposition into four distinct subbands. A
“0” in the label of a edge is replaced by “0000” in the label
of a next edge, in order to obtain same length labels at a
certain depth of the tree. A “1” in the label of a edge is
replaced by one of the strings “0000”,... ,"1111” in the label
of the next edge, which indicates the further decomposi-
tions of the 4 subbands. I.e., the string “0000” indicates
that no subband is decomposed, the string “0001” indi-
cates that the last subband (HH) is decomposed, ..., and
the string “1111” indicates that all subbands are decom-
posed. A label uniquely identifies a further decomposition.
Note that 016 denotes the string 0000000000000000 and
analogous is the meaning of 116. A unique code for a node
is derived by a separated concatenation of the edge labels
from a path from the root to the node. We use “,” as a
separator. Each node corresponds to a certain WP. Figure
8b shows how the edges and edge labels are determined
by the predecessor edge. The function pre: E ® E gives
the predecessor edge of an edge, e.g., in Figure 8b the pre-
decessor of the edge labeled y, l(e) = y, is the edge labeled
x, i.e., l(pre(e)) = x. S(x, r1, ..., rn) denotes the string
obtained by applying the substitution rules r1 to rn to
string x. If there is a complex rule, which allow choices, i.
e., the right side of one rule is a set of strings, S(x, r1,...,rn)
denotes the set of all possible substitutions. In Figure 8b
new edges are added to the vertex (s, x) depending on the
edge label x: the label of the first edge is obtained by sub-
stituting every “0” in x by “0000” and every “1” by “0000”.
The labels of all outgoing edges of (s, x) are obtained by all
possible substitutions of a “1” in x. The last edge (see
Figure 8b) is obtained by substituting all “1"s by “1111”. A
predecessor label determines the edges and edge labels in
the following way:
l(e) = y, l(pre(e)) = x, x ∈ {0, 1}n, x = (x1, ..., xn) , xi ∈ {0, 1}
y ∈ S (x, 0 → 0000, 1 → {0000, ..., 1111}) ⊂ {0, 1}4n
The function p assigns each edge a probability (the
probabilities of the outgoing edges of a node sum up to
1). The probability of an edge can be determined by its
label y and the label of its predecessor x, by simply con-
sidering the number of actual decomposition decisions
(Σyi) and the number of maximally possible decomposi-
tion decisions (4Σxi):
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l(e) = y, l(pre(e)) = x, p(y) = pyil (1 − pl)4xi−yi
Every leaf of a game tree with depth g corresponds to
exactly one WP ψ with maximum decomposition depth
g, the probability of a WP ψ is derived by the product of
the edge weights p of the path from the root to the leaf.
ψ ∈ V : p(ψ) = e∈Path(root,ψ)p(e)
We denote the entropy of corresponding distribution





However, as the number of leaves at depth g is Q(g)
the computation of the entropy of the distribution on
WPs on the basis of this formula is soon infeasible with
growing g.
Cumulative game tree
A simpler representation of a game tree Gg is its corre-
sponding cumulative game tree (CuGa-Tree), Cg. A
CuGa-Tree Cg is the tuple (V, E, l, p, n):
l : E → N, p : E → R+, n : E → N
A CuGa-Tree summarizes the edges of a node with
the with the same probability p, i.e., with the same num-
ber of decomposition decisions, i.e., with the same num-
ber of “1"s in the edge label of the game tree. Thus the
edge label of a CuGa-Tree indicates the number of
decomposition decisions, i.e., the number of subbands
which are further decomposed. We have to keep track
how many edges of the game tree are summarized by an
edge of a CuGa-Tree, therefore we introduce a weight
function n : E ® N. A CuGa-Tree with depth 2 is
shown in Figure 9.
The edges and edge labels are determined by the pre-
decessor edge (see Figure 9b): the successors of an edge
with label l(e) = i (this number of subbands have been
decomposed) can be in the range of 0 to 4i, as every
subband may have up to four children:
l(pre(e)) = i, l(e) ∈ {0, ..., 4i}
The probability for an edge is similar to game trees:
p(e) = pl(e)l (1 − pl)4l(pre(e))−l(e)
The number of edges in the game tree with the same
probability is derived by counting the number of edges
with the same number of “1"s, i.e., decomposition deci-
sions in the edge label: There are 4l(pre(e)) possible











The probability p and weight n are defined for vertices































































Figure 8 Random generation of isotropic WP, the game tree.
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The entropy of the corresponding distribution of a





The nodes can be uniquely identified by the path from
the root, i.e., by tuple of edge labels. A node at depth g
is a g-tuple of edge labels (x1,..., xg). The set of all nodes
at depth g is given by {(x1,...,xg)|x1 Î {0,1},xi+1 ≤ 4xi}.
Appendix 2: Details on the entropy computation
of distributions of decomposition structures on
resolutions
In order to assess the MQ-security of KDWP we need
to compute the entropy of the resulting distribution of
the decomposition structures on a resolution, i.e., on the
subband is the result of always decomposing the low
pass band further (no high pass filtering, i.e., either the
LL, LX or XL subband). Thus only the case of a low
pass band decomposition is of interest up to the depth
d of the targeted resolution (see Figure 10). The entropy
of the decomposition structures of a resolution corre-
sponds to the entropy of the tree of Figure 10, the
depth of the resolution has to be considered for the
split-probability in sub-tree Cg−d, which is indicated by
the notation Cg−d(pd). Thus entropy computation is
straight-forward, namely the entropy of the
decomposition structures for a resolution d can be com-
puted by:
q = 1 − d−1l=0 pl, p = d−1l=0 pl
H
(Rg,d) = q1dl/q + p1dl/p + pH (Cg−d (pd))
Endnotes
ahttp://jj2000.epfl.ch/. bLinux binaries in version 6.3.1
from http://www.kakadusoftware.com.
Acknowledgements
This work was funded by the Austrian Science Fund under Project 19159.
The authors thank Stefan Huber and Rade Kutil, and Roland Kwitt for the
valuable discussions and contributions.
Author details
1University of Applied Sciences, Urstein Sued 1, 5412 Puch/Salzburg Austria
2Dept. of Computer Sciences, University of Salzburg, Jakob Haringer Str. 2,
5020 Salzburg, Austria
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 3 June 2011 Accepted: 13 April 2012 Published: 13 April 2012
References
1. BM Macq, JJ Quisquater, Cryptology for digital TV broadcasting. Proc IEEE.
83(6):944–957 (1995)
2. ISO/IEC 15444-1, Information technology–JPEG2000 image coding system.
Part 1: Core coding system. (2000)
3. D Taubman, M Marcellin, JPEG2000–Image Compression Fundamentals,
Standards and Practice. (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2002)
4. Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC (DCI), Digital cinema system specification
v1.1, online presentation. (2007)
5. R Grosbois, P Gerbelot, T Ebrahimi, Authentication and access control in the
JPEG2000 compressed domain. in Applications of Digital Image Processing
XXIV, ser Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 4472, ed. by Tescher A (San Diego, CA,
USA, 2001), pp. 95–104
6. H Kiya, D Imaizumi, O Watanabe, Partial-scrambling of image encoded
using JPEG2000 without generating marker codes. in Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP’03), vol. III.
(Barcelona, Spain, 2003), pp. 205–208
7. T Stütz, A Uhl, On format-compliant iterative encryption of JPEG2000.
Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE International Symposium on Multimedia
(ISM’06). (IEEE Computer Society, San Diego, CA, USA, 2006), pp. 985–990
8. M Grangetto, E Magli, G Olmo, Multimedia selective encryption by means




























































Figure 10 The entropy of distributions of decomposition
structures on resolutions.
Engel et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2012, 2012:2
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/2
Page 15 of 16
9. Y Yang, BB Zhu, Y Yang, S Li, N Yu, Efficient and syntax-compliant JPEG2000
encryption preserving original fine granularity of scalability. EURASIP J Inf
Security (2007). 2007:056365
10. T Stütz, A Uhl, On efficient transparent JPEG2000 encryption. Proceedings of
ACM Multimedia and Security Workshop, MM-SEC ‘07. (New York, NY, USA,
ACM, 2007), pp. 97–108
11. D Engel, T Stütz, A Uhl, A survey on JPEG2000 encryption. Multimedia Syst.
15(4):243–270 (2009)
12. ISO/IEC 15444-8, Information technology–JPEG2000 image coding system.
Part 8: Secure JPEG2000. (2007)
13. ITU-T T.807, Information technology–JPEG2000 image coding system. Part 8:
Secure JPEG2000. (2006)
14. B Macq, J Quisquater, Digital images multiresolution encryption. J
Interactive Multimedia Association Intellectual Property Project. 1(1):179–206
(1994)
15. T Stütz, V Pankajakshan, F Autrusseau, A Uhl, H Hofbauer, Subjective and
objective quality assessment of transparently encrypted JPEG2000 images.
Proceedings of the ACM Multimedia and Security Workshop (MMSEC’10).
(ACM, Rome, Italy, 2010), pp. 247–252
16. D Engel, A Uhl, Secret wavelet packet decompositions for JPEG2000
lightweight encryption. in Proceedings of 31st International Conference on
Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP’06, vol. V. (Toulouse,
France, 2006), pp. 465–468
17. G Unnikrishnan, K Singh, Double random fractional fourier-domain
encoding for optical security. Opt Eng. 39(11):2853–2859 (2000)
18. L Vorwerk, T Engel, C Meinel, A proposal for a combination of compression
and encryption. in ser Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 4067. (Perth, Australia, 2000),
pp. 694–702
19. A Pommer, A Uhl, Wavelet packet methods for multimedia compression
and encryption. Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Pacific Rim Conference on
Communications, Computers and Signal Processing. (Victoria, Canada: IEEE
Signal Processing Society, 2001), pp. 1–4
20. A Pommer, A Uhl, Lightweight protection of visual data using high-
dimensional wavelet parametriza-tion. in Image Analysis and Processing -
ICIAP 2005, ser. Lecture Notes on Computer Science, vol. 3617, ed. by Roli F,
Vitulano S (Cagliari, Italy, 2005), pp. 645–652
21. A Uhl, A Pommer, Are parameterised biorthogonal wavelet filters suited
(better) for selective encryption? in Multimedia and Security Workshop 2004,
ed. by Dittmann J, Fridrich J (Magdeburg, Germany, 2004), pp. 100–106
22. A Pommer, A Uhl, Selective encryption of wavelet packet subband
structures for secure transmission of visual data. in Multimedia and Security
Workshop, ACM Multimedia, ed. by Dittmann J, Fridrich J, Wohlmacher P
(Juan-les-Pins, France, 2002), pp. 67–70
23. A Pommer, A Uhl, Selective encryption of wavelet-packet encoded image
data–efficiency and security. ACM Multimedia Syst (Special issue on
Multimedia Security). 9(3):279–287 (2003)
24. T Köckerbauer, M Kumar, A Uhl, Lightweight JPEG2000 confidentiality for
mobile environments. in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference
on Multimedia and Expo, ICME’04, vol. 2. (Taipei, Taiwan, 2004), pp.
1495–1498
25. D Engel, A Uhl, Parameterized biorthogonal wavelet lifting for lightweight
JPEG2000 transparent encryption. Proceedings of ACM Multimedia and
Security Workshop, MM-SEC’05. (New York, NY, USA, 2005), pp. 63–70
26. D Engel, R Kutil, A Uhl, A symbolic transform attack on lightweight
encryption based on wavelet filter parameterization. Proceedings of ACM
Multimedia and Security Workshop, MM-SEC’06. (Geneva, Switzerland, 2006),
pp. 202–207
27. W Zeng, S Lei, Efficient frequency domain selective scrambling of digital
video. 5(1):118–129 (2003)
28. S-KA Yeung, S Zhu, B Zeng, Partial video encryption based on alternating
transforms. IEEE Signal Process Lett. 16(10):893–896 (2009)
29. ISO/IEC 15444-2, Information technology–JPEG2000 image coding system.
Part 2: Extensions. (2004)
30. D Engel, A Uhl, Lightweight JPEG2000 encryption with anisotropic wavelet
packets. Proceedings of International Conference on Multimedia & Expo,
ICME’06. (Toronto, Canada, 2006), pp. 2177–2180
31. D Engel, A Uhl, An evaluation of lightweight JPEG2000 encryption with
anisotropic wavelet packets. in Security, Steganography, and Watermarking of
Multimedia Contents IX, ser Proceedings of SPIE, ed. by Delp EJ, Wong PW
(SPIE, San Jose, CA, USA, 2007), pp. 65 051S1–65 051S10
32. M Wickerhauser, Adapted Wavelet Analysis from Theory to Software. (A.K.
Peters, Wellesley, Mass, 1994)
33. K Ramchandran, M Vetterli, Best wavelet packet bases in a rate-distortion
sense. IEEE Trans Image Process. 2(2):160–175 (1993)
34. T Stütz, B Mühlbacher, A Uhl, Best wavelet packet bases in a JPEG2000 rate-
distortion sense: the impact of header data. Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Multimedia & Expo, ICME’10. (Singapore, 2010),
pp. 19–24
35. T Stütz, A Uhl, Efficient wavelet packet basis selection in JPEG2000.
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Image Processing, ICIP’11.
(Brussels, Belgium, 2011), pp. 317–320
36. T Stütz, A Uhl, Efficient and rate-distortion optimal wavelet packet basis
selection in JPEG2000. IEEE Trans Multimedia. (in press)
37. R Kutil, D Engel, Methods for the anisotropic wavelet packet transform.
Appl Comput Harmonic Anal. 25(3):295–314 (2008)
38. A Pommer, A Uhl, Selective encryption of wavelet packet subband
structures for obscured transmission of visual data. Proceedings of the 3rd
IEEE Benelux Signal Processing Symposium (SPS 2002). (IEEE Benelux Signal
Processing Chapter, Leuven, Belgium, 2002), pp. 25–28
39. CE Shannon, Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell Syst Tech J.
28, 656–715 (1949)
40. O Goldreich, The Foundations of Cryptography. (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2001)
41. M Bellare, T Ristenpart, P Rogaway, T Stegers, Format-preserving encryption.
in Proceedings of Selected Areas in Cryptography, SAC’09, vol. 5867.
(Calgary, Canada, 2009), pp. 295–312
42. T Stütz, A Uhl, Efficient format-compliant encryption of regular languages:
block-based cycle-walking. in Proceedings of the 11th Joint IFIP TC6 and TC11
Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security, CMS’10, ser. IFIP
Advances in Information and Communication Technology, vol. 6109, ed. by
Decker BD, Schaum?ü?ller-Bichl I (Springer, Linz, Austria, 2010), pp. 81–92
43. A Said, Measuring the strength of partial encryption schemes. Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP’05). 2,
1126–1129 (2005)
44. Y Mao, M Wu, A joint signal processing and cryptographic approach to
multimedia encryption. IEEE Trans Image Process. 15(7):2061–2075 (2006)
doi:10.1186/1687-417X-2012-2
Cite this article as: Engel et al.: Assessing JPEG2000 encryption with
key-dependent wavelet packets. EURASIP Journal on Information Security
2012 2012:2.
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and benefi t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the fi eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
Engel et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2012, 2012:2
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/2
Page 16 of 16
